

Committee 12
(a)

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

Amended Page
20 May 1975
SECOM-M-174
2 May 1975

Minutes
One Hundred Seventy-Fourth Meeting
Tuesday, 29 April 1975, 1000 to 1300 Hours
Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters

[Redacted]

Chairman
Presiding

25X1

MEMBERS PRESENT

[Redacted]

25X1

ALTERNATES PRESENT

[Redacted]

25X1

ALSO PRESENT

[Redacted]

25X1

*Present for part of meeting

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
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U N C L A S S I F I E D

SECOM-M-174
2 May 1975

Preliminary Remarks

The Chairman referred to the paper prepared by the Committee to assist departments and agencies in sanitizing certain documents provided to Select Committees. He mentioned that there was some opposition to the term "sanitization" and the paper had been modified to replace this term with the word "paraphrasing." The recast paper has been approved by the DCI and distributed to members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and to members of the Security Committee at the 29 April meeting.

The Chairman mentioned that he had attended a meeting with members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on 23 April. At this meeting a package of material was discussed including papers on the "Third Agency Rule," procedures for summoning and interviewing witnesses and the concept of a "monitor" who would represent the department or agency interest at hearings, and "Guidelines on Paraphrasing Certain Documents Provided the Select Committees." There were no decisions arrived at and the Senate Committee continues to consider the proposals. Security Committee members will be informed of the outcome of these deliberations.

In response to a question by the NSA member, the Chairman informed that no specific date had been given for the start of the full actions by the Senate Select Committee. At the meeting on 23 April staff members mentioned expectations of beginning interviews within a week or ten days. Some former employees had already been interviewed. The approach to be used by the Senate Select Committee will be one of division of effort by teams of staff officers which would be simultaneously addressing different areas of interest. Some team leader assignments have already been made within the staff:

Mr. John Elliff has been designated head of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force which will address the interest in the FBI.

Mr. William Bader has been designated head of the Command and Control Task Force which will address the CIA.

Other Task Force or team leaders have been mentioned in the press but nothing official has been heard.

In addition to the 23 April meeting attended by [] there have been other meetings with the staff of the Senate Select Committee not attended by the Chairman. There had been no further tasking for the Security Committee in consequence of these other meetings and the Chairman informed members that he would continue to provide information related to security interests as it became available.

In connection with the activities of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, [] told members that [] had met with Chairman Nedzi for preliminary discussions. [] had subsequently requested [] to contact the House Select Committee security officer, Mr. Carl H. Simms. Mr. Simms met with [] on 21 April 1975.

Mr. Simms is a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel. He previously did security work in connection with the Impeachment Hearings where he worked with Mr. Benjamin Marshall, Security Director for the Senate Select Committee. [] said that he had a very favorable impression of Mr. Simms. He appeared to be cooperative in advancing mutual security interests for the protection of sensitive intelligence. Mr. Simms had expressed appreciation for the offers of assistance made by []. He was provided copies of the "Guidelines for Protection of Classified Information and Documents Furnished the Select Committees," the suggested Secrecy Agreement, 11 March 1975 letter to Sen. Church from DCI, 12 March 1975 letter to DCI from Sen. Church and CIA Employee Bulletin, dated 12 March 1975, titled "Senate Select Committee to Review US Intelligence Activities."

[] had proposed a meeting of the Security Committee for the purpose of introducing members to Mr. Simms. This offer was readily accepted but Mr. Simms requested that it not be scheduled until he had an opportunity to proceed further with security arrangements, including selection of appropriate space and other members of the staff.

[] mentioned that Mr. Simms had accepted the offer to visit CIA and look over various security equipments that Mr. Simms might like to consider obtaining for the House Select Committee.

[] endorsed the Chairman's observations about the cooperativeness displayed by Mr. Simms.

In response to the Chairman's request for suggestions, the Navy member proposed that, in the interest of furthering a coordinated perception of security needs, all material made available to [] be provided to Mr. Simms. The Navy member also endorsed the idea of the Committee meeting with Mr. Simms.

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In general discussion it was noted that it is not known if Simms has any clearances. The FBI member said that he was not aware that any background investigations had been requested of the FBI for House Select Committee staff members but was of the opinion that the Bureau would conduct such investigations if requested by the House Committee as it had for the Senate Committee. In discussion about the clearance procedures being followed by the Senate Select Committee, it was mentioned that Senator Church on receipt of the FBI's background investigation, had been making certification of clearability against the criteria of E.O. 10450 and DCID 1/14 for TOP SECRET and compartmented clearances to the DCI. The CIA had briefed some members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee for SI, TK [] clearances. A list of staff personnel and notations of clearances held by them was distributed to members. It was also mentioned [] that names of staff personnel holding compartmented clearances had been entered in the central registry and were available for normal certification by the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB).

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1. Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 173rd meeting held on 15 April were approved as published.

2. Report of Chairmen of Subcommittees

(a) TSCS [] Chairman, was unable to attend the meeting. There was no report of outstanding activities of the TSCS.

(b) Computer Security Subcommittee - In the absence of the Chairman of the Subcommittee, [] mentioned that the Computer Security Subcommittee continued to address the differences surfaced on the draft revision of DCID 1/16.

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(c) Compartmentation Subcommittee

25X1 [] Chairman, reported continued attention to and work on DCID 1/7. Two meetings of the DCID 1/7 Working Group had produced a new draft (No. 5) which hopefully represented a satisfactory resolution of the original difficulties which had polarized the group. Remaining problems will be addressed by the Subcommittee at a meeting on 5 May and a report submitted to the Security Committee in time for its next meeting.

25X1 [] expressed his appreciation to members of the Committee, and specifically [] for their level of interest and efforts in resolution of the problems associated with revision of DCID 1/7. He acknowledged that wide differences had been expressed originally and that only considerable attention by members had allowed satisfactory agreements to be reached.

(d) Community Computer-Assisted Compartmentation Control Working Group

25X1 [] mentioned that he had been informed by [] Chairman, that this working group had reviewed both the CIA and DIA cost effectiveness studies and that the Working Group was now preparing their recommendations for the Security Committee which will be available in the near future.

(e) USIB Declassification Guidelines Working Group

25X1 [] referred to his previously expressed proposal to call a small meeting to include the Executive Director of the ICRC, [] in the interest of resolving current difficulties with the guidelines. He mentioned that another revision to accommodate ICRC and DoD comments is being prepared and after this is done he will attempt to schedule the meeting with []. In response to a suggestion by the Navy member, [] agreed to circulate the latest revision prior to

25X1 the meeting with [] if it appeared that the latest comments
by ICRQ and DoD resulted in significant changes. If the revision
consisted of minor changes, [] will first seek acceptance
25X1 by [] and then provide the guidelines to the members. The
Chairman welcomed participation of any member in the meeting with
25X1 []

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3. Discussion of DCID 1/14

The Chairman mentioned that the State member had advised him that State was in favor of the draft DCID 1/14 as presented to the Committee. State withdrew its dissent to the Subcommittee's recommendation for approval and promulgation since implementation of other studies appears to be too far off to warrant further delay on DCID 1/14.

In response to the Chairman's call for comments:

Navy commented that they considered the paper to be excellent over all. The Working Group and the Subcommittee earned a full measure of credit for production of a well-organized, tight, coherent paper. Navy agreed in substance with the draft DCID before the Committee but acknowledged some minor changes were being proposed by Navy.

Air Force agreed with the Navy's observations and also offered proposals for some changes.

NSA informed originally that they did not concur in the subject draft. NSA was of the opinion that any substantive changes in DCID 1/14 could be accommodated without wholesale changes resulting in an unacceptable substitution. The NSA member also spoke of strong concern with the trend to accept reduced requirements for the Background Investigation and coverage afforded on reinvestigation which are reflected in the draft revision of DCID 1/14. Crediting acceptance of the reduced requirements to undue concern with cost factors, the NSA member opted for an expression by all members of the Committee of a

desire for higher standards of coverage and a formatting of DCID 1/14 that would reflect this position. At a minimum the NSA would like to have a strong statement permitting each agency to be allowed to set its own standards and ask for more than the minimum coverage set forth in DCID 1/14. This position was premised on the recognition that NSA is dependent on the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for all of its investigations and the fact that DIS has declared that extensive studies question the cost effectiveness of reinvestigations and original investigations and that as a result DIS would conduct investigations only to the minimum standards as set forth in DCID 1/14.

The CIA member reluctantly concurred in the draft and said that the concurrence was in recognition of a need for uniform personnel security standards on which community clearance certifications could be based. It was the CIA member's opinion that the draft standards tend to dilute compartmented clearances.

The DIA member concurred in the draft and informed that he intended to insist on full reinvestigation in event of any indication of derogatory information.

FBI, ERDA, Army and Treasury concurred in the present draft.

Following a general discussion and in view of comments made by NSA, Air Force and Navy members, the Air Force member proposed and the Chairman and members agreed to review the latest draft of DCID 1/14 on a page-by-page basis. The resulting revision, which includes all agreed-on changes, is attached.

On conclusion of the review, the NSA member said that the amended version of DCID 1/14 was acceptable as it stands and he withdrew nonconcurrence. However, he desired to prepare and distribute for member consideration a conceptual proposal to separate consumers from producers in considering personnel for investigations and reinvestigations.


This was agreeable to the Chairman and members and the NSA member agreed to distribute such a paper directly to members at an early date and in plenty of time for full consideration before discussion at the next Committee meeting.

4. New Business

There was no new business raised at the meeting.

5. Next Meeting

The next meeting of the Security Committee was scheduled for 1000 hours, Tuesday, 20 May 1975 in Room 6E-0708 CIA Headquarters.


Executive Secretary

25X1

Attachment

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 1/14
UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING
ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.

(Effective date of promulgation)¹

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 (effective 17 February 1972) subparagraph 3f and paragraph 7, minimum personnel security standards and procedures are hereby established and promulgated for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants and contractors who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (hereinafter referred to as SCI). The provisions of this directive are not intended to preclude departments and agencies, operating under their separately invested authorities, from establishing additional security measures as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained.

¹The term "Sensitive Compartmented Information" as used in this directive is intended to include all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Purpose:

1. To provide for the maximum security protection to SCI as it is exchanged among, and used within, participating collection and user departments and agencies, it is necessary to establish uniform personnel security standards and procedures applicable to all personnel permitted access to SCI, irrespective of departmental and agency directives and regulations governing access to other categories of classified information.

Applicability:

2. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all persons under the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Executive Branch, without regard to civilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service.

3. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely for this reason, be considered ineligible for access to other classified information. Conversely, individuals whose access to SCI has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14 or 15 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered eligible for access to other classified information.

General:

4. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle under

procedures prescribed in the several existing authorities which govern access thereto, and in accordance with the uniform personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this directive.

Personnel Security Standards:

5. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access to SCI are as follows:

a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 13 below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security risk is negligible:

(1) Both the individual and the members of his/her immediate family shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes "immediate family" is defined as including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.

(2) Neither the individual members of the immediate family nor persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation should be subject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign power; nor should they advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow or alter the Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Investigative Requirements:

6. The individual under consideration for access to SCI will be the subject of a thorough investigation designed to develop information as to whether the individual clearly meets the Personnel Security Approval Criteria listed in paragraph 5., above.

7. The investigation shall be accomplished through personal interviews by trained investigative personnel and shall establish affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include birth, residences, education, employments and military service. Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts available.

8. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a statement authorizing access to police, credit, education and medical records by the investigator. Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required.

9. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:

a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship through qualified sources.

b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and such other national agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be conducted on those members of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens.

c. A check of appropriate police records where possible covering all areas where the individual has resided in the U.S. throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period.

d. Verification of the individual's current financial status and credit habits through checks of appropriate credit institutions where feasible and interviews with knowledgeable sources covering the most recent five (5) years.

e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences in excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This coverage shall be expanded where the investigation otherwise suggests the existence of some questionable behavioral pattern.

f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period but in any event the most recent two years. Personal

interviews with supervisors and/or co-workers at places of employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished to the extent practicable.

g. Verification of attendance at institutes of higher learning in all instances, and at the last attended secondary school when such attendance occurred within the past fifteen (15) years. Attendance at secondary schools may be verified through qualified collateral sources. If attendance at educational institutions occurred within the most recent five (5) years, personal interviews with faculty members and/or other persons who were acquainted with the individual during his attendance shall be accomplished to the extent feasible.

h. Review of appropriate military records.

i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable acquaintances (a minimum of three developed during the course of the investigation) as necessary to provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's activities and behaviorial patterns over the past fifteen years with particular emphasis on the most recent five years.

j. When employment, education or residence, has occurred overseas (except for periods of less than five (5) years for U.S. Government personnel and less than ninety days for all others) during the past fifteen years or since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Department of State,

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desire for higher standards of coverage and a formating of DCID 1/14 that would reflect this position. At a minimum the NSA would like to have a strong statement permitting each agency to be allowed to set its own standards and ask for more than the minimum coverage set forth in DCID 1/14. This position was premised on the recognition that NSA is dependent on the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for all of its investigations and the fact that DIS has declared that extensive studies question the cost effectiveness of reinvestigations and original investigations and that as a result DIS would conduct investigations only to the minimum standards as set forth in DCID 1/14.

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This was agreeable to the Chairman and members and the NSA member agreed to distribute such a paper directly to members at an early date and in plenty of time for full consideration before discussion at the next Committee meeting.

m. A personal interview of the individual will be conducted by trained security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to resolve any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed during the investigation.

10. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up-to-date in accordance with the investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 9, above. Should new information be developed during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.

11. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic re-investigation of personnel provided access to SCI. These re-investigations will be conducted on a five-year recurrent basis, but on a more frequent basis where the individual has demonstrated some questionable behavioral pattern or where the individual's

activities are otherwise suspect. The scope of these re-investigations shall be determined by department and agency heads represented on USIB based on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the individual's defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability and probable effectiveness of other means to continually evaluate factors related to the individual's suitability for continued access. In all cases, the re-investigation shall include, at a minimum, appropriate national agency checks, local agency (including overseas checks where appropriate) and credit checks, and a personal interview by trained investigative, security or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to resolve significant adverse information or inconsistencies.*

*NSA and Air Force recommends that paragraph 11 read:

"Department and agency heads shall develop security programs under which at intervals no greater than five years a reinvestigation is conducted on personnel having access to SCI. All reinvestigations shall include, as a minimum, appropriate National Agency Checks, Local Agency Checks (including overseas checks if feasible), credit checks and, where feasible, a personal interview by security or counterintelligence personnel. In order to ensure continued maximum protection to SCI, department and agency heads will establish such additional investigative scope requirements they deem necessary. In determining additional scope requirements, department and agency heads should consider the relationship of the individual requiring access to, or participation in, collection of compartmented information, the technical processes involved, and the sensitivity of sources and methods, as well as his degree of knowledge of SCI planning, programs and product. "

Evaluations:

12. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other information developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not been met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense determination based on all available information.

Exceptions:

13. The exceptions to paragraph 5 above may be granted only by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the parent organization represented on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military departments, or his designees, unless such authority has been specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in inter-departmental agreements.

14. When there is compelling need to grant access to sensitive compartmented information prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, such investigative checks as are

immediately possible shall be made at once, and should include a personal interview by trained security or counter-intelligence personnel. Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment.

15. All exceptions granted will be common sense determinations based on all available information, and shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial period of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements, and judicious review of the information therein must be made before an exception is considered.

Continuing Security Programs:

16. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative requirements established by this directive, member departments and agencies shall institute continuing security programs for all individuals having access to SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject

to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to SCI, the department, agency or Government program to which he is assigned shall assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his assignment.

17. The continuing security programs shall include the following:

a. Security education programs to ensure that individuals who are granted access to SCI are initially and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protection. During these indoctrinations, the individual should be informed that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining eligibility for continued access to SCI rests with the individual. Therefore, the individual is encouraged to seek appropriate guidance and assistance on any personal problem or situation which may have a possible bearing on his eligibility for continued access to SCI, and security counseling should be made available.

b. Security supervisory programs to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility in matters pertaining to the security of SCI, including the eligibility for SCI access. Such programs shall provide

practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.

c. Continuing security review programs to ensure that any change in the individual's personal or official status is evaluated in terms of his continued access to SCI.

18. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of sufficient scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information, or inconsistency, in question so that a determination can be made as to whether the individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

Effective Date:

19. This policy shall become effective as soon as practicable after approval of this Directive but in no case later than _____. Existing directives,² regulations, agreements, and such other references governing access to SCI as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

²These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation sections of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE

6 MAY 1975

SUBJECT: Recommended Revision of DCID 1/14

Request that the recommended revision of DCID 1/14 currently under consideration by the Security Committee be changed to reflect the following:

Page 5, para d.:

"d. Verification of the individual's current financial status and credit habits through checks of appropriate credit institutions where permissible by law, and interviews with knowledgeable sources covering the most recent five (5) years."

Rationale: With the increasing trend toward denying information to investigative resources, the aspect of credit and financial status of persons under consideration for access to SCI is most important. We feel it is imperative that a more positive direction be given to the investigating agencies than that which is formulated in the term "where feasible."

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 USAF

NOTE: The DCI has recently forwarded to the Congress for consideration, a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947 providing for statutory recognition of "sensitive information relating to intelligence sources and methods" (similar to that afforded "Restricted Data" in the Atomic Energy Act.) This bill, if adopted, will provide AUTHORITY to the DCI, as well as the current RESPONSIBILITY, for protecting this sensitive information.